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Abstract Recent work in psychology on ‘cultural cognition’ suggests that our cultural background 
drives our attitudes towards a range of politically contentious issues in science such as global 
warming. This work is part of a more general attempt to investigate the ways in which our wants, 
wishes and desires impact on our assessments of information, events and theories. Put crudely, 
the idea is that we conform our assessments of the evidence for and against scientific theories with 
clear political relevance to our pre-existing political beliefs and convictions. In this paper I explore 
the epistemological consequences of cultural cognition. What does it mean for the rationality of 
our beliefs about issues such as global warming? I argue for an unsettling conclusion. Not only are 
those on the ‘political right’ who reject the scientific consensus on issues like global warming 
unjustified in doing so, some of those on the ‘political left’ who accept the consensus are also 
unjustified in doing so. I finish by addressing the practical implications of my conclusions. 
1. Introductory Remarks 
It is a common observation that our views about certain scientific topics ‘track’ our political 
affiliations and broader cultural backgrounds. If you are told Daisy is a ‘liberal Democrat’1 and 
lives in New York, you will expect Daisy to accept that global warming2 is happening, and human 
activity is causing it; if you are told Rachael is a ‘conservative Republican’ and lives in Wyoming, 
you will expect Rachael to be more suspicious of the impact of human activity on global warming, 
and of the existence of global warming itself.3 These expectations are reasonable when you 
consider the statistical data. A 2017 report from the Yale Program on Climate Change 
Communication gives us this breakdown of the variation in beliefs about global warming across 
the political divide: 
 71% of registered voters in the US think global warming is happening. But beliefs about 
whether it is happening vary widely across the political spectrum: 97% of liberal Democrats 
think global warming is happening, as opposed to only 42% of conservative Republicans. 
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There is also a divide between self-described ‘moderates’: 85% of moderate Democrats 
think it is happening, as opposed to 65% of moderate Republicans. 
 56% of registered voters think global warming is largely caused by human activities. But, 
again, beliefs vary widely across the political spectrum: 87% of liberal Democrats think 
global warming is largely caused by human activities, as opposed to 30% of conservative 
Republicans. Again, there is also a divide between moderates: 62% of moderate Democrats 
think it is largely caused by human activities, as opposed to 45% of moderate Republicans.4 
There are several ways in which one might try to explain this variation in beliefs. Some hold that 
liberals are just smarter than conservatives.5 More guardedly, others hold that conservatives tend 
to have certain personality traits (e.g. closed-mindedness) that might explain why they are resistant 
to evidence that goes against their deeply held political convictions.6 What these explanations have 
in common is that they postulate an epistemological asymmetry between liberal and conservative 
attitudes about scientific issues such as global warming. Liberals tend to appreciate the force of 
the scientific evidence and tend to accept that global warming is happening (and humans are the 
cause of it) on the basis of this evidence, whereas conservatives tend to reject that evidence, and 
so tend to deny that global warming is happening. Liberal Democrats like Daisy are justified in their 
belief that global warming is happening; conservative Republicans like Rachael are unjustified in 
their denial that global warming is happening. 
In this paper I focus on work in psychology and political science on cultural cognition.7 Dan Kahan 
and his collaborators present evidence that both liberals and conservatives form beliefs about 
politically contentious scientific issues (such as global warming) in ways that reflect their political 
views and broader cultural identities. I want to explore the epistemological consequences of 
cultural cognition. I argue that, because cultural cognition is not a reliable way of forming beliefs 
about politically contentious scientific issues, if you learn that your beliefs about these issues were 
formed via cultural cognition, and that cultural cognition is not a reliable way of forming beliefs 
about such issues, then you should downgrade your confidence in (or even abandon) these beliefs. 
I claim that this goes both for conservative Republicans like Rachael and liberal democrats like 
Daisy. This conclusion, if right, is unsettling. It is no surprise to learn that conservative Republicans 
are unjustified in rejecting the evidence for global warming. It would be surprising to learn that 
many liberal Democrats who, like Daisy, accept the evidence, are not necessarily justified in doing 
so. 
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Here is the plan. §2 introduces and reviews the evidence for cultural cognition. §3 argues for my 
unsettling conclusion. §4-5 address two objections to this argument. §6 addresses the practical 
implications of my conclusions. 
2. Cultural Cognition: Some Background 
Our wants, wishes, desires and preferences impact on our cognitive processes. In the psychology 
literature, work on motivated reasoning looks at the extent and nature of this impact. This work 
documents the myriad ways in which we tend to (unconsciously) conform our assessments of 
information, events and theories to goals other than the goal of basing our judgements on the best 
available information.8 For example: 
 We tend to take responsibility for our successes (‘I’m good at this’) and deny responsibility 
for our failures (‘I was unlucky’).9 
 We tend to give more credence to information that confirms our perception of ourselves 
as kind, competent and healthy than to information that challenges these perceptions.10  
 We describe scientific research that confirms our views on complex social issues (e.g. 
capital punishment) as better conducted, and its conclusions as more valid, than research 
that clashes with our strongly held views.11 
Manifestations of motivated reasoning can be distinguished according to the goals or motivations 
they serve. Much of the literature focuses on the goal of maintaining a positive self-conception.12 
But other work focuses on politically motivated reasoning.13 
When we engage in politically motivated reasoning, we subject information that conflicts with (or 
that we perceive to conflict with) our political convictions to extensive scrutiny, trying to find flaws 
and reasons to dismiss. But, when we receive information that supports (or that we perceive to 
support) our political convictions, we accept it uncritically. For instance, Milton Taber and Charles 
Lodge conducted a study in which subjects from across the political spectrum were asked to assess 
the strength of arguments for and against gun control and affirmative action policies.14 They found 
that their assessments were influenced by their political beliefs about these topics. Subjects were 
given the same set of arguments, but evaluated the arguments that supported their pre-existing 
views as stronger than the arguments that challenged those views.  
Taber and Lodge hypothesise that this is the result of two biases. First, we tend to spend more 
time finding flaws with arguments that challenge our deeply-held political convictions than we do 
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on finding flaws with arguments that support these convictions. Second, when we are free to 
choose which information to expose ourselves to, we tend to seek out arguments that will confirm 
our deeply-held political convictions rather than arguments that will challenge these convictions. 
These biases lead to attitude polarisation: our attitudes about ‘hot’ political topics like gun control 
and affirmative action policies become more extreme over time. It is crucial to note that these 
biases are more pronounced in those with higher levels of political sophistication. Thus, these 
results are not due to ignorance of the relevant political issues. This has important implications for 
the question of what can be done to ameliorate the impact of politically motivated reasoning on 
democratic institutions.15 
How widespread is politically motivated reasoning? In their work Kahan and his collaborators look 
at the following topics, among others: 
 Attitudes about global warming. 
 Attitudes about the safety of ‘burying’ nuclear waste underground. 
 Attitudes about the efficacy of ‘concealed carry’ laws. 
Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman found that those on the ‘political left’ tend to think there is 
scientific consensus that humans are causing global warming whereas those on the ‘political right’ 
tend to think that scientists are divided.16 But those on the left tend to deny that there is scientific 
consensus that there are safe methods of disposing of nuclear waste. While those on the right also 
tend to deny this, they are significantly less sceptical than those on the left. Finally, those on the 
left tend to think that most scientists agree that concealed carry laws are not effective, whereas 
those on the right tend to think that most scientists agree that concealed carry laws are effective. 
What does this tell us? First, these findings suggest that the reason why there is such widespread 
disagreement among laypersons about issues like global warming and the safety of burying nuclear 
waste is not because laypersons are unwilling to defer to expert opinion and consensus. Rather, 
the reason is that there is widespread disagreement among laypersons about what the expert 
consensus actually is. 
Second, this puts both those on the right and those on the left at odds with expert scientific 
opinion, at least as it is represented in ‘expert consensus reports’ produced by the US National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS). The NAS has issued reports detailing scientific consensus that 
humans are causing global warming17 and that there are safe methods of burying nuclear waste.18 
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The NAS has also issued a report that the evidence doesn’t permit forming a conclusion on the 
efficacy of concealed carry laws.19 These findings therefore suggest that those on the right are out 
of step with the scientific consensus when it comes to global warming. But they also suggest that 
those on the left are out of step with the scientific consensus when it comes to the safety of burying 
nuclear waste. And both those on the right and those on the left are overly optimistic about what 
the evidence shows about the efficacy of concealed carry laws, albeit in different ways. Both 
overestimate the extent to which the evidence supports their favoured position. 
Finally, all this provides support for the ‘cultural cognition thesis’. Laypersons’ political convictions 
impact on their beliefs about the scientific consensus on global warming and other ‘hot’ political 
issues. They tend to overestimate the level of scientific support for positions that conform (or that 
they perceive to conform) with their political convictions. Further, they tend to underestimate the 
level of scientific support for positions that don’t conform (or that they perceive to not conform) 
with their political convictions. This goes for both sides of the political spectrum, not just those 
on the right. Those on the right (radically) underestimate the level of scientific support for (human-
caused) global warming, but those on the left underestimate the level of scientific support for the 
safety of burying nuclear waste. One might argue that cultural cognition is more pronounced 
amongst those on the right. This may be so, but that hardly shows it doesn’t also affect those on 
the left. 
This completes my overview of the evidence for cultural cognition. The take-home message is that 
there is compelling evidence that we tend to conform our assessment of information about 
politically relevant scientific issues to our political beliefs. This tendency holds across the political 
spectrum, although it is arguably more pronounced amongst those on the right. I now turn to the 
epistemological consequences of this work. 
3. Epistemological Consequences of  Cultural Cognition 
§2 presented evidence for the cultural cognition thesis: our political convictions impact on our 
beliefs about scientific issues, like global warming, that are clearly relevant to public policy and 
have acquired widely recognised social meanings. This section explores the epistemological 
consequences of cultural cognition. I will argue that, if you learn that your beliefs about these 
issues were formed via cultural cognition, and that cultural cognition is not a reliable way of 
forming beliefs about such issues, then you should downgrade your confidence in (or even 
abandon) these beliefs. 
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Here is my argument: 
1. Many of us form beliefs about scientific topics with a broader political relevance through 
cultural cognition. 
2. Cultural cognition is not a reliable way of forming beliefs about scientific topics with a 
broader political relevance. 
3. If you learn that your belief that p was formed through a belief-forming process that is not 
reliable, you should downgrade your confidence in (or even abandon) your belief that p. 
4. If you learn that your beliefs about scientific topics with a broader political relevance were 
formed through cultural cognition, and that cultural cognition is not a reliable way of 
forming beliefs about such topics, then you should downgrade your confidence in (or even 
abandon) your beliefs about these topics. 
I will defend each premise in turn.20 The empirical evidence surveyed in §2 shows that many of us 
form beliefs about politically contentious scientific topics through cultural cognition. That said, it 
is worth emphasising two respects in which the influence of cultural cognition is limited. First, 
there is work suggesting that monetary incentives diminish the impact of motivated reasoning on 
judgements about political issues.21 There is also work suggesting that motivated reasoning is most 
pronounced when it comes to attitudes and beliefs to which we attach a lot of importance, whether 
personal, political or cultural22, and that experts don’t engage in cultural cognition with respect to 
issues within their domain(s) of expertise.23 
It is however important to note that there is no evidence that the effects of cultural cognition 
lessen as scientific comprehension and literacy increase. On the face of it, you would think that 
public scepticism about what are regarded as settled issues in science (like that human activity is 
causing global warming) is correlated with public ignorance about the relevant science. Put bluntly, 
the less you know about climate science, the more likely you are to be sceptical about the existence 
of global warming, still less that human activity is causing it. But one study found that the opposite 
is the case, at least for individuals on the political right.24 Higher levels of scientific comprehension 
are associated with a small decrease in the perceived seriousness of the threat posed by global 
warming. All told, this suggests that many of us assess evidence and form judgements about 
politically relevant scientific issues in ways that conform with our political convictions, and that 
knowing more about the relevant issues not only doesn’t guard against this tendency but can 
exacerbate it. 
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Turning now to the second premise, the empirical evidence surveyed in §2 also shows that cultural 
cognition is not a reliable way of forming beliefs about politically contentious scientific topics. The 
evidence suggests that, as a matter of fact, cultural cognition leads those on the (political) left to 
form true beliefs about some scientific topics (e.g. global warming), but it also leads them to form 
false beliefs about other scientific topics (e.g. the safety of burying nuclear waste). Cultural cognition 
leads those on the (political) right to form false beliefs about the scientific consensus on global 
warming, but it also means they are less out-of-step with the scientific consensus on the safety of 
burying nuclear waste. These findings therefore suggest that cultural cognition is a way of forming 
beliefs about scientific topics with a broader political relevance that sometimes gets it right, but 
other times gets it wrong. While the sample-size is too small to reach a definitive conclusion about 
the reliability of politically motivated reasoning in the relevant domains (we would need to look at 
other scientific issues, such as nanotechnology, GMOs, the safety of vaccinations, or of nuclear 
power in general), it is fair to say that the evidence does not show that it is reliable in this domain, 
no matter whether it is applied by those on the political left, or those on the political right.25  
It is also important to note that I am not claiming that cultural cognition is, in general, an unreliable 
belief-forming process. Whether cultural cognition is a reliable way of forming beliefs about a 
particular topic or in a certain domain is an empirical question, and can only be answered by 
looking at the available empirical evidence. The evidence summarised in §2 strongly suggests that 
cultural cognition is not a reliable way of forming beliefs about politically contentious scientific 
topic. If one wanted to claim that cultural cognition is not reliable in other domains, one would 
need to gather evidence about those domains.  
So far I have argued that the empirical evidence supports the first two premises. I take the third 
premise to require epistemological rather than empirical support. I will argue that this support can be 
found in the recent (social) epistemological literature on epistemically irrelevant influences on 
belief. Many of our beliefs are influenced by factors that have nothing to do with the truth of the 
relevant beliefs. For instance, you might think that our political beliefs are shaped by our 
upbringing.26 Or, in line with the evidence presented in §2, you might think that our beliefs about 
politically relevant science are shaped by our political beliefs and broader cultural background.  
The crucial question in the literature on irrelevant influences is often taken to be whether the 
recognition that irrelevant influences have shaped a wide range of our beliefs should lead us to 
doubt, or even abandon, these beliefs.27 But, in my view, this is not the crucial question. I am happy 
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to grant that the recognition that irrelevant influences have shaped a wide range of our beliefs need 
not occasion any sort of sceptical worry. But the reason why it need not occasion any sort of 
sceptical worry is because it need not be accompanied by the recognition that the relevant beliefs 
are likely mistaken because of the irrelevant influences that have shaped them. What if I not only 
recognised that my political beliefs have been shaped by my upbringing but also that my political 
beliefs are likely to be mistaken because of this? This surely would occasion a sceptical worry about 
my political beliefs: their causal origins mean they are likely to be mistaken! The underlying 
principle here is identified in an insightful recent paper by Katia Vavova: 
Good Independent Reason Principle (GIRP): To the extent that you have good independent28 
reason to think that you are mistaken with respect to p, you must revise your confidence in p 
accordingly—insofar as you can.29 
Vavova’s point is that, while the mere recognition that your beliefs have been influenced by 
irrelevant factors need not lead you to revise your confidence—it need not give you any reason to 
think the beliefs are mistaken—the recognition that your beliefs are likely to be mistaken because 
of this should lead you to revise your confidence. This is because, in general, you should revise 
your beliefs when you have good reason to think they are mistaken. One way in which you can get 
good reason to think your beliefs are mistaken is by learning that they were produced by a belief-
forming process that is not reliable. So the third premise follows straightforwardly from Vavova’s 
principle. If you learn that a belief was produced by a belief-forming process that is not reliable, 
then you have good reason to think that you are mistaken with respect to the relevant belief, and 
you must downgrade your confidence in it. 
This completes my defence of the third premise, and so of my argument. In the next two sections 
I address two objections to my argument, before turning to the practical consequences in the final 
section. 
4. Independence I 
The first objection is that the third premise is too strong. Imagine you form a belief through a 
process that is not reliable, yet later come to have independent reasons for thinking that the belief is 
true. For instance, Catriona formed the belief that Morven is innocent of a terrible crime because 
of wishful thinking, but she later acquired excellent evidence that Morven is innocent, and now 
believes on this basis. One might think that Catriona is now justified in believing that Morven is 
innocent, because she now has independent reasons—that is, reasons that are entirely separate 
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from the way in which she initially formed her belief—for thinking that Morven is innocent. If 
you find this thought compelling, then the third premise must be modified as follows: 
3*. If you learn that a belief that p was formed through a belief-forming process that is not 
reliable, and you lack independent reasons for thinking that p is true, you should 
downgrade your confidence in (or even abandon) your belief that p. 
One might now object that the experimental work surveyed in §2 only shows that many of us 
formed our beliefs about politically relevant science through cultural cognition. It does not show 
that many of us also lack independent reason for thinking these beliefs are true. So the empirical 
evidence doesn’t establish what is required to run the argument. 
I think this worry is misplaced for two reasons. First, the experimental work doesn’t just show that 
we initially formed beliefs about politically relevant scientific topics through cultural cognition. It 
also shows that cultural cognition impacts on how we assess new evidence and information 
pertaining to these topics. Work on cultural cognition doesn’t just show that a global warming 
sceptic (or a sceptic about the safety of nuclear power) initially forms a view about global warming 
that conforms with their political beliefs and broader cultural background. It also shows that a 
global warming sceptic assesses new evidence and information about global warming in ways that 
buttress their existing (sceptical) beliefs. 
Second, many (though not all) of us lack any reason to think our beliefs about most scientific 
topics are true other than that they are supported by what we take the scientific consensus to be. 
We are therefore forced to fall back on expert opinion. The problem posed by work on cultural 
cognition is that it shows that our political convictions also impact on our evaluations of who the 
experts are. Kahan, Jenkins-Smith and Braman present studies which show that subjects’ 
assessments of the level of expertise of (fictional) scientists with seemingly impeccable credentials 
correlate with how well their positions on topics such as global warming and nuclear waste disposal 
conform to their political convictions.30 Put simply, we regard scientists who take positions with 
which we disagree as having less expertise than scientists who take positions with which we agree. 
The problem is therefore that, where we might want laypersons to apply neutral conditions for 
identifying experts about topics like global warming, laypersons in fact form impressions about 
who the experts are that are influenced by their prior political beliefs.31 
If this is right, then we can modify the conclusion of the argument accordingly: 
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4*. If you learn (i) that your beliefs about scientific topics with a broader political relevance 
were formed through cultural cognition (ii) cultural cognition is not a reliable way of 
forming beliefs about such topics, and you lack independent reasons for thinking these 
beliefs are true, then you should downgrade your confidence in (or even abandon) your 
beliefs about these topics. 
This modified conclusion still has the same unsettling implications as the original conclusion. 
While I will work with the original third premise and conclusion for the rest of this paper, the 
reader should bear in mind that these modified versions are also available. 
5. Independence II 
The second objection also concerns the issue of independence, albeit in a slightly different way. 
My argument relied on Vavova’s principle GIRP, which says that, to the extent that you have good 
independent reason to think that you are mistaken with respect to p, you must revise your confidence 
in p accordingly. By ‘independent’ Vavova means independent of the reasoning and evidence that 
initially led you to adopt your belief that p.32 So her thought is that, when you are considering 
whether you are mistaken in having the belief that p in light of some reason R for thinking the 
belief is mistaken, you must bracket the reasoning that initially led you to adopt the belief.33 But 
one might object that this seems to give the wrong result in certain cases. Consider: 
MAIL: You have recently moved into a new house. Someone by the name of Vickers used to 
live in the house, but never told the post office that she moved, so you keep on getting her 
mail. You know that Vickers doesn’t live in the house—she’s nowhere to be found! Yet you 
keep on seeing mail addressed to her, which would be good reason to think that she lived in 
the house if you didn’t know better.34 
If we bracket the reasoning that initially led you to adopt the belief that Vickers doesn’t live in the 
house, then it seems that you do have good independent reason to think that your belief is mistaken. 
There’s all this mail addressed to her, which is a good reason to think she lives in the house (when 
you ignore all the evidence that she doesn’t). But it doesn’t seem like you should revise your 
confidence at all. So GIRP seems to give the wrong result here. 
It may well be that the defender of GIRP can respond to this objection. But for my purposes it 
will be simpler to modify GIRP. I will say that, if you are considering whether you are mistaken in 
believing that p in light of some reason R for thinking your belief is mistaken, you only need to 
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bracket all the reasoning and evidence that is undermined by R. So, for example, when you are 
considering whether the mail addressed to Vickers is a good reason to think you are mistaken in 
believing that Vickers doesn’t live in the house, you don’t need to bracket your abundant evidence 
that she doesn’t live in the house, because the presence of the mail in no way undermines this 
evidence. In contrast, if you had a good reason to think that you had been hallucinating since you 
moved into the house (imagine you find out you have been accidentally ingesting large quantities 
of LSD) then maybe you would need to bracket your evidence that she doesn’t live in the house. 
This means I endorse the following principle: 
Good Undermining Reason Principle (GURP): To the extent that you have a good reason (or 
good reasons) to think you are mistaken with respect to p that undermines your initial basis 
for believing that p—that is, to the extent that you have a good undermining reason to think you 
are mistaken with respect to p—you must revise your confidence in p accordingly—insofar as 
you can. 
This principle delivers the right result in MAIL: the reason you have to think your belief that Vickers 
doesn’t live in the house is mistaken doesn’t undermine your initial basis for believing that Vickers 
doesn’t live in the house. This principle also supports the third premise of my argument. One way 
in which you can get a good undermining reason to think your beliefs are mistaken is by learning 
that the way in which you formed your beliefs wasn’t reliable. So the third premise also follows 
straightforwardly from GURP.35 
I want to finish by addressing one final issue. Both GIRP and GURP contain a proviso that I 
haven’t said anything about yet. They both say that you must revise your confidence insofar as you 
can. But can we really do this? In the final section I address this question, along with some other 
broader implications of my argument. 
6. Assessing the Implications 
I have argued for a normative prescription: If you learn that your beliefs about topics like global 
warming were formed through cultural cognition, and that cultural cognition is not a reliable way 
of forming beliefs about such topics, then you should downgrade your confidence in these beliefs. 
This conclusion, if true, is unsettling. It is no surprise to learn that conservative Republicans like 
Rachael are unjustified in rejecting the evidence for global warming. If I am right, liberal 
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Democrats like Daisy, who accept the evidence, may also be unjustified in doing so. But what, 
exactly, follows from this normative prescription?  
We can start with the implications for a subject who falls under this normative prescription. 
Imagine Daisy and Rachael have both formed their beliefs about scientific topics like climate 
change through cultural cognition. They are presented with the evidence that this is so, and the 
evidence that cultural cognition is not reliable when it comes to such topics.36 I say that, as a result, 
they should at least downgrade their confidence in these beliefs.  
One might object that there are good reasons for thinking that they will in fact not do this. We 
tend to hold on to cherished beliefs and attitudes even in the face of clear and contradictory 
evidence.37 This raises the worry that my normative prescription is idle: neither Daisy nor Rachael 
will do what I say they should, so what’s the point in arguing they should do it?38 
Let me start with a concession. Normative prescriptions can’t demand that we do the 
(psychologically) impossible. Human rationality is “bounded”,39 and prescriptions saying what we 
should and shouldn’t do must obey these bounds. Still, while it is very difficult to persuade subjects 
to abandon their most cherished beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence, there is ample 
evidence that it is possible. Humans are more open to being persuaded that their most cherished 
beliefs are false when they are given reason not to tie their sense of self-worth to these beliefs.40 
The underlying idea is that evidence against a cherished belief is a serious threat to one’s sense of 
self-worth. One way of responding to this threat is by discarding the evidence. But, if one is given 
an alternative way of responding to this threat, one may be more willing to take the evidence on 
board.41 So, while it may be difficult to get Daisy and Rachael to downgrade their confidence, there 
are concrete steps that could be taken to help them do so.  
What about the broader implications? I want to highlight two. First, I have argued that, for most 
laypersons, if they were to become aware of the evidence on cultural cognition and the role it plays 
in fomenting controversy about topics like climate change, they should downgrade their 
confidence in their beliefs about these topics, no matter what these beliefs are. This does not mean 
that I take a scenario in which laypersons all downgrade their confidence in their beliefs about 
these topics to be optimal! While climate change denial would no longer be an obstacle to collective 
action in this scenario, a collective suspension of judgement would likely prove to be as much of 
an obstacle, if not more.  
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The moral I want to draw is rather about the nature and causes of the problem of public scepticism 
about science.42 Laypersons’—no matter their scientific literacy—evaluate information pertaining 
to scientific topics with a broader political relevance in ways that reflect and confirm their existing 
beliefs. As a result, many laypersons—no matter their scientific literacy—have unjustified beliefs 
about certain scientific topics. This diagnosis of the nature and causes of the problem of public 
scepticism conflicts with a familiar narrative.43 According to this familiar narrative, the problem is 
partly that most laypersons are ignorant about science, and partly that some laypersons (those with 
conservative political beliefs) are ‘anti-science’. This narrative gains plausibility from the facts that 
a lot of laypersons are ignorant and a lot of conservatives are anti-science. But, if I am right, neither 
ignorance nor conservative ideology is the central cause of the problem.  
Second, what steps could be taken to resolve this problem? Cultural cognition poses a problem 
for what Elizabeth Anderson calls institutional epistemology.44 One of the central questions of 
institutional epistemology is how social institutions (science, democracies) can do a better job of 
producing and disseminating knowledge. Cultural cognition poses a problem for our systems of 
knowledge dissemination because it leads individuals to either reject certain scientific results 
outright (because they clash with their political beliefs), or to accept them merely because they 
happen to fit with their political beliefs and convictions. Individuals therefore end up with either 
false or unjustified beliefs about politically relevant science.  
Given that cultural cognition is not going to go away, we need to come up with ways of managing 
the epistemic environment so that the influence of cultural cognition on how individuals think 
about politically contentious scientific topics is minimised. We can look to the literature on science 
communication for suggestions as to how this could be done.45 One suggestion is to look at how 
topics like climate change are framed. Discussions of what to do about climate change are often 
framed in terms of what we can do to reduce carbon emissions. This leads to a situation where 
(put crudely) conservatives need to choose between the science and their conviction that business 
should be free from government interference. While carbon emissions reductions are important, 
we can emphasise other solutions, some of which might be more appealing to conservative 
sensibilities (e.g. nuclear power). The point is not to advocate for a ‘conservative-friendly’ set of 
measures to combat climate change, but rather to better articulate the variety of solutions that are 
available. 
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Another suggestion is to look at who does the communicating. There are conservatives who accept 
the science on climate change (and liberals who accept that nuclear power can be safe). As 
discussed above, we generally prefer to receive information from sources we perceive to be similar 
to us. While this has its downsides—we would rather listen to someone who is like us than 
someone who isn’t, even if we have reason to think they are less likely to be right—it has potential 
upsides in the present context. If we take steps to ensure that a politically diverse group make the 
case for action on climate change (or for the safety of nuclear power), we have reason to think that 
this would be more effective. 
One might object that these measures are, in certain sense, unprincipled. If the worry is just that 
these measures aren’t going to stop us using our background political beliefs and cultural values to 
decide how much weight to give to evidence and information we receive, then I would grant the 
point, but respond that this would be asking too much. But if the worry is that these measures are 
aimed at better marketing science rather than at winning people over by the force of reasons and 
evidence, then I would respond that the whole point is to market science in such a way that people 
can be won over by the force of reasons and evidence. 
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Notes 
1 Because the literature I deal with is US-centric, it makes sense to adopt a US-centric framing of 
political debate. 
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